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RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR'S




The industrial unrest of 1947 prodded the Pennsylvania Legislature into
enacting the Pennsylvania Public Employee Anti-Strike Act of 1947.'
Today, at least eleven states in addition to Pennsylvania prohibit by
legislation strikes by public employees,2 and most of this no-strike
legislation has been passed since World War I I in apparent reaction to a
series of public employee strikes in the postwar period.
After two decades of frustrating experiences with these blanket no-
strike laws, and "[a]s the problems of labor relations in public
employment grew, several cities, notably New York and Philadelphia,
developed machinery to deal with their employees."' Many states and
the federal government, recognizing the "altered climate for public
employee relations in recent years,"' established commissions to ex-
amine trends and experiences, with recommendations for new, amended
legislation.' In June of 1968, the Governor's Commission to Revise
I. Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 215.1 ei seq.
(1964); see R. SPERO, GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYERS 33 (1948).
2. See Note, The Strike and its Alternatives in Public Employment, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 549, 552
n.16.
3. ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LABOR RELATIONS Rep. 132, at 6 (1958);
R. SPERO, supra note I at 29.
4. GOLDBERG, Labor-Management Relations Laws in Public Service, 2 BNA GOVT EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS REP. No. 249, at D-2 (1968).
5. Id.
6. Id. at D-3 n. 7; See generally Comment, Labor Problems in Public Employment, 61 Nw. U.L.
REV. 105 (1966); Wallerstein, Labor Relations in Public Employment-The Federal Experience,
PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 205
(1966); Weisenfeld, Public Employees-First or Second Class Citizens, 10 LAB. L.J. 685 (1965).
7. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEES LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVISE THE PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES LAW OF PENNSYLVANIA, 2 BNA GOVT. EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REP., No. 251, (1968)
[Hereinafter cited as Hickman Commission Report]. The Commission consisted of 12 persons
under the chairmanship of Leon Hickman, retired Executive Vice President of the Aluminum
Company of America. The members of the Commission were: Dr. Harold F. Alderfer, former State
Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction and retired Director of the Pennsylvania State
Institute of Local Government; Hon. P. Freeman Hankins, member of the Pennsylvania Senate.
and rankirfg minority party member of the Committee on Labor and Industry; John W. Ingram,
President, Pennsylvania Economy League and former State Secretary of Administration; Bernard
N. Katz, Esquire, specialist in labor law; Robert H. Kleeb, Esquire, former regional attorney
for the National Labor Relations.Board; Hon. Edward B. Mifflin, member Pennsylvania House
of Representatives and Chairman of the House Labor Relations Committee; Very Rev. N.R.H.
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the Public Employment Law of Pennsylvania (The Hickman Com-
mision)7 submitted its report and recommendations for changes in
the public employment relations posture Pennsylvania has maintained
since the Pennsylvania Public Employee Anti-Strike Act was passed in
1947.
When one considers the steady growth of public employment over the
past decades,8 the projected growth of employment in the public sector in
the future,9 and the growth rate of public employee unionism,"0 it is
fair to say that these changes will most certainly lead to an increased
number of labor disputes in the public sector in the future." Conse-
quently, these facts would seem to attest to the need to (1) review the
current Pennsylvania law concerning public employment relations, and
(2) outline and assess the recommendations of the Hickman Com-
mission.
I. THE PRESENT LAW
Organizational and Representation Rights
Public employees in Pennsylvania are not governed by the Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Act,' 2 for this act exclusively applies to employees
engaged in "industrial disputes."' 3 Nor do public employees have any
other statutory right to join a labor organization. However, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the 1947 Anti-Strike Act"
does not prohibit public employees from joining a labor organization,
and consequently such membership is permissible.'5 In addition, there is
presently no statutory machinery for determination of appropriate
Moor, Dean, Trinity Episcopal Church, retired, and Chairman, Pittsburgh Labor Management
Council; Emil E. Narrick, Esquire, Assistant General Counsel, United Steel Workers of America,
and Chairman, Allegheny County Planning Commission; Max Rosenn, Esquire, former State
Secretary of Welfare; Dr. William G. Willis, Vice President Temple University, and former
Director of the University of Pittsburgh Institute of Local Government; Hon. John K. Tabor
(non-voting), State Secretary of Labor and Industry.
8. Smith & McLaughlin, Public Employment: A Neglected Area of Research and Training in
Labor Relations, 16 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 30, 31 (1962).
9. U.S. OFFICE OF MANPOWER AUTOMATION AND TRAINING, DEPT. OF LABOR, MANPOWER
REPORT NO.9, EMPLOYMENT TRENDS AND MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS IN GOVERNMENT 1 (1963).
10. See statistics in Brinker, Recent Trends of Labor Unions in Government, 12 LAB. L.J. 13, 14-
18 (1961). See also Zagoria, A New Frontier in Collective Bargaining: Public Workers and Citizens
Bosses, 19 LAB. L.J. 387 (1968).
1I. See Anderson, Disputes Affecting Government Employees, 10 LAB. L.J. 707 (1959).
12. Act of June 1, 1937, P.L. 1168, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 211.1 et seq. (1964).
13. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. Overbrook Golf Club, 385 Pa. 358, 363, 123 A.2d
698, 700 (1956); Petitidn of Salvation Army, 349 Pa. 105, 106!07, 36 A.2d 479, 480 (1944).
14. Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 215.1, et seq. (1964).
15. Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 611, 88 A.2d 878 (1952).
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LAW
bargaining units, exclusive union representation, union security or dues
check-off for public employees. Consequently, organization of the public
employment sector in Pennsylvania has been a most difficult and
confusing process, beset with many labor disputes culminating in work
stoppages.'
6
Collective Bargaining and The Collective Bargaining Agreement"
Public employees in Pennsylvania have no right to compel their public
employers to bargain in good faith. At least they have no right to compel
good faith collective bargaining in the traditional sense of sitting down
with employer representatives and negotiating an employment contract.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania stated in Pittsburgh City Fire
Fighters v. Barr"s that,
The situation of the municipal employee, however, is far different. While
governmental units recognize unions . . . as bargaining agents of the municipal
workers, they do not sit down and enter into collective bargaining
agreements. . . . Indeed, absent statutory authorization, a governmental unit
does not have the power to bind itself to its employees by the terms of a contract.'9
To compensate somewhat for the absence of collective bargaining in
public employment, the court has broadly construed the words
"grievance or controversy" in Section I of the Anti-Strike Act" to
include
not merely the day to day complaints which normally are settled by the grievance
procedure in the industrial context. Rather, in the governmental situation, these
16. The confrontation between the Pittsburgh Board of Public Education and the Pittsburgh
Federation of Teachers in the Spring of 1968 is a good example of the frustration and ultimate loss
of manhours due to striking which has resulted due to the nonavailability of statutory procedures in
the area of organizational and representation rights for public employees. See 2 BNA GOVT.
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REP., No. 232 at E-I (1968); 2 BNA GovT. EMPLOYEE RELATION REP., No.
234 at F-I (1968).
17. The following discussion of the rights of public employees in the area of collective bargaining
and collective bargaining agreements does not apply to policemen and firemen who are now covered
by act I I1, enacted June 24, 1968 (S.B. 1343, L. 1968) requiring good faith collective bargaining
between policemen and firemen and their public employer, providing for arbitration, and requiring
compliance with collective bargaining agreements and findings of arbitrators.
18. Pittsburgh City Fire Fighters Local No. 1 v. Barr, 408 Pa. 325, 184 A.2d 588 (1962).
19. Id. at 331-32, 184 A.2d at 591-92 citing Scott. Philadelphia Parking Authority, 402 Pa. 15 1,
166 A.2d 278 (1960).
20. Act of June 30, 1947, P.L. 1183 § I, as amended. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 215.1 et seq.
(1964). The relevant provisions of § 215.1 are as follows:
In order to avoid or minimize any possible controversies by making available full and
adequate governmental facilities for the adjustment of grievances, the governmental agency
involved, at the request of the public employees, shall, within fifteen (15) days of such
request, set up a panel of three members. . ..
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grievances also concern the main elements of an employment relationship-wages,
hours, working conditions, etc.-matters which in the industrial situation are
determined in the collective bargaining agreement.'
Consequently, while no traditional collective bargaining is required
between the parties, the disputes, traditionally considered proper subjects
of collective bargaining in the private sector, are included under a
broadly defined interpretation of "grievance or controversy" and are
therefore proper subjects for tripartite "arbitration" under Section 1 of
the Pennsylvania Anti-Strike Act . Either party to a disagreement may
request that a tripartite panel be created and may by an action of
mandamus compel the other party to appoint a panel member to
participate in the grievance machinery.22 The philosophy of the present
law is that
Through the airing of the respective positions of the parties and the attendant
coverage by the news media, . . . [the parties] are afforded ample opportunity to
place their position before the public and muster public sentiment on their
side. . . . [T]hrough such a process parties often are able to arrive at a mutual
understanding of their respective positions, thereby making the final negotiation
more fruitful.23
Several difficulties have been encountered under Section 1 of the
Anti-Strike Act. The panel recommendations are only advisory and are
not binding upon either party.2 1 Since the parties negotiate from an
unequal position initially, given the inability of the public employees to
strike legally, many have felt that the right of access to the grievance
machinery is an illusory right at best.25 The issue of dues check-off is not
a "grievance or controversy" under the 1947 act and therefore is not a
proper subject for reconciliation through the statutory machinery.
26
Consequently there is presently no statutory procedure for the
reconciliation of negotiation impasses on this subject. The grievance
machinery of Section 1 of the 1947 Act has been held to be inappropriate
for the reconciliation of representation disputes, and there is "serious
doubt" whether a public employer may recognize or bargain exclusively
21. Pittsburgh City Fire Fighters Local No. I v. Barr, 408 Pa. 325, 332, 184 A.2d 588; 592
(1962).
22. Id. at 334, 184 A.2d at 593.
23. Id. at 332-33, 184 A.2d at 592.
24. Erie Fire Fighters Local No. 293 v. Gardner, 406 Pa. 395, 178 A.2d 691 (1962).
25. See Annual Conference of State Labor Relations Agencies, in 1967 BNA LABOR RELATIONS
YEARBOOK 150, 155; Sullivan, How Can the Problem of the Public Employees Strike Be Resolved,
19 OKLA. L; Rav. 365, 376 (1966).
26. Eberly v. Board of School Directors, 43 D. & C.2d 233 (C.P. Bucks County 1967).
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with a public employee representative." Given the inadequacy of the
present law in the areas of union security, dues check-off and impasse
reconciliation mechanisms, one can readily see why Pennsylvania needs
a renovation of its public employment law.
The Strike Question
In Pennsylvania, public employees are unconditionally prohibited from
striking.28 Any public employee who strikes automatically abandons his
employment and may not hold his job except if reappointed or
reemployed. 29 He may be reappointed or reemployed under the present
law only upon the following conditions: (a) his compensation shall not
exceed that received by him immediately prior to his violation, (b) he
may not have his compensation increased until after three years from the
date of his reappointment or reemployment, and (c) he shall be on
probation for five years following his reappointment or reemployment."
For teachers and civil service employees and others who have tenure by
statute, condition (c) has the effect of suspending tenure for the period of
the probation. The practical effect of these harsh discharge penalties
(which are exactly the same three conditions that were imposed under the
ill-famed and now-repealed Condon-Wadlin Act of New York)3 is that
employees, especially those whose skills are in short supply, will not seek
reappointment or reemployment. A school board faced with the
resignation of one-third of their faculty, for instance, will either not
enforce the statute against strong unions or will seek amnesty legislation
excluding certain classes of public employees from the statutory
penalties.32
II. THE HICKMAN COMMISSION REPORT
Conclusions and Recommendations
After conferring with officials of Wisconsin and Michigan and the City
of New York concerning the administration of their laws regulating
public employee bargaining, and after holding public hearings and
conferring with representatives of sixty-three agencies representing a
27. Philadelphia Teachers' Ass'n v. LaBrum, 415 Pa. 212, 203 A.2d 34 (1964).
28. Act of June 31, 1947, P.L. 1183 § 2, as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43 § 215.2 (1964).
29. Id. §§ 215.2-.3
30. Id. § 215.4.
31. Condon-Wadlin Act, N.Y. Sess. Laws, ch. 790 § 108 (McKinney 1958).
32. See Gould, The New York Taylor Law: A Preliminary Assessment, 18 LAB. L.J. 323, 324
(1967).
1968]
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broad spectrum of both public employees and employers,33 the
Commission recommended the following:
1. The Public Employee Act of 1947 should be repealed and replaced
by an entirely new Public Employee Law34
The Commission outlined three basic weaknesses of the law. Thie 1947
act does not require collective bargaining, and this has led to an almost
complete breakdown of communication when the public employer has
not chosen to recognize a right of its employees to bargain collectively.
(This weakness the Commission felt was the greatest cause of public
employment strikes.) The forbidding of all strikes by public employees
was unreasonable and unenforceable, especially when coupled with an
ineffective collective bargaining mechanism. The harsh mandatory
penalties of the 1947 act are self-defeating since to drive a public
employee of considerable experience and skill to work elsewhere is, in the
last analysis, to do the community a great disservice.
2. The new act should cover all public employees"
The Commission felt that only if the new law covers all public bodies
and their employees, could "consistent application of basic employment
policies" be insured to everyone in the public service. It was suggested
however that privately incorporated agencies receiving financial support
from the state should not be included under the proposed new law.
3. The new law should recognize the right of all public employees to
bargain collectively
3 6
The Commission contended that the new law should give public
employees the right of organization and representation by an agent
chosen through elections supervised by the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board. Their hearings indicated that the recognition of this right,
coupled with statutory procedures by which it can be brought into being,
would do more to resolve disputes than anything else that could be done.
To safeguard against abuse by either party, the Commission suggested
that the appropriateness of the bargaining unit should be determined by
the Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board pursuant to statutory guide-
lines.37
33. Hickman Commission Report, supra note 7, at E- 1.
34. Id. at E-I, E-2.
35. Id. at E-2.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Gould, supra note 3 1, at 325.
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Contending that permitting a union shop would be inappropriate in
public employment, the Commission suggested a compromise in the area
of union security. The Commission recommended that it would be
permissible for a contract to be made with an employer for an agency
shop,38 and that statutory provisions should be provided to prevent fees
paid to the union by nonmembers from being used for other purposes
unrelated to collective bargaining, such as political contributions.
4. The new law should require good faith bargaining39
Recognizing that permitting collective bargaining over wages, hours,
and conditions of employment is only a partial solution, the
Commission recommended that good faith bargaining by both parties be
required. The Commission felt that an impasse could not be declared
until, at a minimum, the parties have bargained, requested assistance
from the State Mediation Service and submitted the dispute to a fact-
finding board, or, in the case of firemen and policemen, submitted the
dispute to binding arbitration.
5. The right to strike should be recognized but should be strictly
limited
The Commission recommended that the Commonwealth recognize
the right to strike by public employees if two conditions are met. First,
No one should have a right to strike until all collective bargaining procedures
have been exhausted. If there is a strike before all collective bargaining procedures
are exhausted, no other showing should be needed to cause the appropriate court to
enjoin the strike. 0
Secondly, the Commission stated:
Likewise there can be no right of public employees to strike if the health, safety
or welfare of the public is endangered. . . . Consequently, the legislation we
recommend will provide that if a strike is threatened or occurs after collective
bargaining has been exhausted, it can begin or continue only so long as public
health, safety or welfare are not in danger.
4'
38. An agency shop is a union security device whereby membership in the employee union is not a
condition of employment, but non-member employees in the bargaining unit are required to pay to
the bargaining agent a fee as reimbursement to the employee organization for its services as
bargaining representative for the entire group.
39. Hickman Commission Report, supra note 7, at E-2.
40. Id.
41. Id. at E-3.
19681
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The Commission emphasized that the courts should be empowered to
enjoin a public employee strike once the public health, safety or welfare
is endangered. It also emphasized that the court should be armed with
an arsenal of enforcement penalties. No single penalty should be
mandatory to enforce the court injunction (as is mandatory dismissal
under the present law). Rather the court should be able to impose a
penalty upon striking employees or employee organizations that would
be most appropriate and reasonable under all the circumstances. The
Commission's view is that severe penalties should be made available for
the violation of an injunction, basically taking the form of fines or
imprisonment or both against striking employees and/or their
organizations.
Where the collective bargaining mechanisms have been fully exhausted
and an impasse exists, and public health, safety or welfare is not
endangered, the Commission feels it is inequitable and unwise to prohibit
strikes.
6. The new law should contain a general amnesty clause, waiving
penalties under the 1947 act
As has been stated, the Commission recommended a repeal of the
1947 act. In addition, the proposed legislation should include, the
Commission felt, an authority in all governmental bodies to suspend or
waive all or part of the mandatory penalties of the 1947 act heretofore
imposed. It is felt that the 1947 provisions are proving to be self-defeat-
ing, particularly with respect to teachers who are in short supply. To the
extent that they, and any others with skills in short supply, do not need
to seek reappointment under the repressive penalties of the 1947 act, the
public employers may be seriously crippled unless authority is given to
waive or suspend, in their discretion, the 1947 act's mandatory penalties.
Preliminary Assessment of the Hickman Commission's Recommenda-
tions
1. Underlying premise of the Commission's recommendations
To assess the recommendations of the Hickman Commission, one
must first evaluate the attitudes which generated the Commission's
recommendations. Clearly, if one believes that militant tactics have
absolutely no place in the functions of any organization of government
employees, or if one believes that the process of collective bargaining,
even limited collective bargaining over designated subjects, cannot be
transplanted into the public service, then one cannot begin to accept the
Hickman Commission's conclusions.
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Manifestly, the complete denial of the benefits of collective bargaining
to public employees is totally unrealistic today. Though, admittedly,
different standards and techniques of collective bargaining are necessary
for at least some public employees, nevertheless, public employees can
and should be given greater rights in determining the conditions under
which they work. The anachronistic concept of sovereignty can no longer
deny public employees the greater rights of economic self-determination
they deserve. As James H. J. Tate, President of the National League of
Cities and Mayor of Philadelphia, stated, there is "an evil irony in the
sovereign viewpoint which insists that those who dare interrupt even the
smallest routines of public service in pursuit of parity as first class
citizens, are criminal."42
The Hickman Commission, understanding the lessons of the postwar
period, joined the growing ranks of enlightened administrators and
premised their recommendations on the increased right of public
employees to engage in collective bargaining. This is not really a
revolutionary concept. The federal government recognized this right for
all federal employees in 1962 in Executive Order No. 10988.43 A few
states, notably New York, Wisconsin, and Michigan, have recognized
the right of public employees to bargain collectively. 4 As has been noted
above, even the "grievance and controversy" test in Pennsylvania's
present public employee grievance machinery has been expanded by the
courts to include disputes over wages and conditions of
employment-disputes which are proper subjects for collective
bargaining in the private sector.45
Participation in the determination of wages, hours and working
conditions cannot be distinguished from the accepted concept that each
individual has the right to determine his own future. Sovereignty
concepts have yielded in the area of sovereign tort immunity.
Sovereignty of property rights has yielded considerably to civil rights
and individual rights. That the public sector should enjoy some of the
rights of economic self-determination now enjoyed by the private sector,
therefore, is but another step in the current "assault on the citadel of
sovereignty". To the extent that responsible legislation can bring peace
to the public sector, it is fundamental that such legislation be premised
on the proposition that public employees must be given greater rights in
determining the conditions under which they work. The Hickman
42. Tate, Public Employees' Right to Strike, 39 PA. B.A.Q. 527, 528 (1968).
43. 3 C.F.R. 521,5 U.S.C. § 631 (1962).
44. Tate, supra note41, at 529.
45. Eberly v. Board of School Directors, 43 D. & C.2d 233 (C.P. Bucks County 1967).
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Commission therefore, by premising its recommendations on this
proposition, began at the only logical, moral, and reasonable place it
could. It assumed that public employees must have increased rights to
bargain collectively with their public employers.
2. The strike issue
Once public policy has declared that public employees should have
increased rights to engage in collective bargaining, the issue of the right
to strike already has begun to be answered, where no effective impasse
mechanisms exist as an alternative to the illegal strike. The right to
collective bargaining without the right to strike makes the collective
bargaining right illusory, for the right to engage in collective bargaining
assumes by tradition the right to fight to support one's demands.
Therefore, if one accepts the premise that public employees should have
greater rights in determining the conditions under which they work, and
if one accepts the fundamental proposition that, for this right not to be
illusory, it must be coupled with the right to fight in support of one's
demands, then the conclusion necessarily follows that public employees
must be given an increased right to strike. There cannot be meaningful
collective bargaining between economically unequal parties.
The issue then becomes, how shall the conflict between the right to
strike and the right of the public be resolved? As with most things, the
answer lies in compromise. Clearly, it has been demonstrated that
blanket anti-strike legislation is self-defeating. But the unavailability of
the striking health official to check an epidemic is intolerable.
The Commission believed that its strike proposal constituted an
equitable compromise, offering the greatest benefit to all parties. There
are two very disturbing problems though, that would seem to
overshadow the efficacy of the Commission's proposal concerning this
issue. When does the health, safety and welfare of the public become
endangered to the point that a strike should be disallowed, and why
appoint the courts to decide this question? The Commission offers some
guidance. It recommends that the injunction decision be made by eval-
uating the strike in two time frames. First, what is the situation at the
time the strike is called? Second, if a strike does not initially endanger
the public health, safety and welfare, how long can it continue until the
danger point is reached? By making the "unless or until" test an integral
part of the proposed legislation, the Commission has attempted to offer
guidelines whereby public employees are treated not as a monolith but
rather are treated as a function of their effect on the public health, safety
and welfare. But by offering this as the Commission's guidance on the
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subject, the Commission has unfortunately begged the real issues, as
shall be demonstrated.
It is disturbing indeed that the Commission felt satisfied to gamble the
public employee's right to strike on language as ambiguous as health,
safety and welfare. Is the public employee really gaining anything of
value when his rights balance on judicial interpretation of these
"standards"? Does health mean physical health or can it also mean the
community's general well-being, its economic health? Whose safety is
contemplated to be protected? What safety is the Commission concerned
about? Is not the safety of the taxpayers' investment in the municipal
golf course endangered, when the gardener in the public park strikes?
Shall his strike be enjoined as a threat to the public safety? What is
public welfare? One can well imagine that almost the slightest public
inconvenience could be interpreted as working against the public welfare.
Even the federal government took the position that only threats to health
and safety need be considered to protect the nation from national
emergency strikes under Section 208 of the Labor Management
Relations Act."
The Commission has offered no better standard than health, safety
and welfare and has not given guidance as to what its understanding of
these vague terms is. Without a better standard than health, safety and
welfare, the courts will be forced to set social policy by their
interpretation of the "standard"; the public employee may well find he
has in fact gained little, and perhaps most importantly, the public sector
will not have peace!
To the extent that the Commission's underlying premise is that the
bargaining rights of public employees should be more closely aligned
with the rights now enjoyed by labor in the private sector, it would seem
inconsistent to authorize court injunctions of public employee strikes.
As far back as 1896, legal scholars argued for the proposition that it
was not the proper role of the courts to determine if the labor union
strike is a justifiable means of achieving labor's desired ends.47 The
United States Congress attempted to cure the alleged evils of the labor
injunction by Section 20 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act.48 Due to
legislative obscurity and a reactionary judicial approach which largely
nullified the Clayton Act, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia
Act4" which forbade those labor injunctions which would prohibit
46. 29 U.S.C. § 141 etseq., (1947).
47. See Mr. Justice Holmes' famous dissent in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E.
1077, 1079 (1896).
48. 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1914).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (1932).
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peaceful collective action. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the
majority in United States v. Hutchenson,0 summarized succinctly
the underlying philosophy that generated the restrictions created by the
Norris-LaGuardia Act. The view that the judiciary should determine the
appropriateness of peaceful concerted activity, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
explained, "misconceived the area of economic conflict that had best be
left to economic forces and the pressure of public opinion and not
subjected to the judgment of courts."'
Even the Labor Management Relations Act which authorizes the
President to invoke the national emergency strike procedures of sections
206 through 210 of that act, does not authorize permanent injunctions
against employee strikes. If the strike is not settled within 80 days, the
injunction must be discharged.
Clearly, labor relations by injunction is no longer considered an
acceptable final solution to labor conflicts in the private sector. To
suggest that courts should assume their pre-Norris-LaGuardia role of
deciding social policy in the area of public employment relations by
determining the propriety of public employee strikes, would certainly
seem to be inconsistent with a desire to more closely align the rights of
public employees with those of employees in the private sector. Though
alternatives to the court injunction in public employment may indeed be
few, nevertheless, an assessment of the Hickman Commission Report
would be incomplete without giving cognizance to this apparent
inconsistency.
3. The duty to bargain in good faith
The Commission proposed that the public employer and public em-
ployee be required to bargain in good faith. The Commission further
proposed that if the public employee representatives did not bargain in
good faith the public employees represented would forfeit any right to
strike. The Commission took no position on the important issue of what
sanctions should be imposed upon the public employer if he should fail
to bargain in good faith. It is arguable that the issuance of any strike
injunction should be conditioned on a showing by the public employer of
compliance with his duty to bargain in good faith. In addition to this
void, it appears that the Commission has failed to include any machinery
for the ultimate resolution of disputes that cannot be settled by
bargaining, mediation and fact finding. What if a strike occurs and is
enjoined as against the public interest? How shall the parties ultimately
50. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
51. Id. at 231.
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resolve the dispute? Clearly the problem will not simply go away and the
Commission offers no guidance in its report to even suggest an answer.
The Commission never took a precise position on the issue of who
would administer the "duty to bargain" provision of its
recommendations. It stated that the Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board should appoint fact-finding boards if necessary, but it is very
important to an assessment of the report to understand who has the right
to enforce the statutory duty to bargain in good faith. Can the Labor
Relations Board hear employer or employee charges of bad faith
bargaining or must the situation culminate in a strike and an injunction
be sought before evidence of bad faith bargaining can be formally
presented-and then only to a court?
It is arguable that the enforcement machinery established under this
new law affecting public employees should be- administered, as should
the entire law, by a separate public employee labor relations board. The
special problems of tenure, wage scales prescribed by statute, pension
programs prescribed by statute, curriculum decisions for teachers and
the like, require that administrators bring to the labor board special
expertise in public employment problems. Therefore, the Commission
selected to administer the law should have wide experience in dealing
with the public sector.
The Commission report has not resolved the issues of (1) enforcement
machinery to insure good faith bargaining, (2) sanctions against public
employers who do not bargain in good faith, (3) the special expertise
needed in the area of public employment, or (4) machinery for the
ultimate resolution of disputes. These issues must be resolved if
significant progress is to be made in the area of public employment in
Pennsylvania.
Roger Hartley
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